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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LEONARD M. OLSON,
Plaintiff and AppellantJ
vs.
c:ase No.
INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS,
8668
a corporation, and THOMAS McGAHAN,
Defendants and Respondents._.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
B.

THE FACTS

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant insurance company (a Canadian Corporation) during the year
1947 (P. 31). That under his contract of employment,
he became its manager of the State of Utah, with headquarters at Salt Lake C'ity and Provo (P. 32). That under
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his contract of employment, he was empowered to organize the business affairs of the defendant company for
the purpose of selling memberships by way of insurance
and to employ ,any and all agents for that purpose in
the conduct of defendant's affairs (P. 32). That he continued such employment on, up, and until the 17th day
of February, 1954, at which time his employment was
terminated pur.suant to verbal notice given to him over
the tele·phone in December, 1953, and later confirmed by
letter that his services would terminate as of Feb. 17,
1954 (PP. 33, 164). That by virtue of the telephone communication, plaintiff was instructed by the defendant
company to turn over all the books and records in plaintiff's office to a new man that \Yas coming in to take
plaintiff's place and also he was ordered to turn all
monies in his posse.ssion without an audit, to ascertain
the exact amounts that might be due either party (PP.
33-35, 164). This the plaintiff refused to do stating
definitely and emphatically that before turning over any
monies, he insisted on an audit being made of the books
by the company, which in turn they refused to do (PP.
34-35, 165). That on Feb. 18, 1954, plaintiff caused to be
mailed to the defendant company a registered letter
wherein he stated that he had the monies that he withheld
in his possession ,and intended to keep the same until
a complete audit was had bet,veen the parties. (See Exhibit 2, P. 42-43-44-45.) That at no time or at all did
the defendant company furnish the plaintiff \Yith an audit
showing that what w.as owing fron1 one party to the other
for the purpose of striking a balance due and payable
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to one party or the other (P. 45). That the bank records
show that on Feb. 18, 1954, the plaintiff transferred the r-----.
fund in que.stion in the sum of approximately $5400 from
the .account of the defendant company by him to his (
personal account in Utah Savings and Trust Company of \. ·-. -r~.
Salt Lake City, Utah (P. 49). That thereafter and prior ),fr.1. c:)
to plaintiff leaving the State of Utah for the State of ; 1 /c/! (;!
California to secure other employment, he transferred ( J. ·
said sum to his credit with the First Security Bank of \
Utah, at Salt Lake City, Utah (P. 50). And that there- /
after, in the month of Novemb~r, 1955, he left the State \
of Utah for the State of California and set up his home /
at Walnut Creek, California, and ~ said f~!Lt:r:l,},n,s/
£erred to his credit at his new residence.
I

(

From Feb. 17, 1954, up to and including Oct. 27, 1954,
numerou.s conferences were had between the attorneys
for the plaintiff and the attorneys for the defendant
company, in an attempt to arrive at some reasonable basis
to estimate a settlement between the· parties (P. 46).
When the plaintiff w.as unable to secure an audit fron1
the defendant company, he instituted suit in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake c·ounty, on the 27th
day of October, 1955, in which he demanded an audit and
an accounting between himself and the defendant company, for the purpose of determining who owned who,
so that the differences between the parties could be settled by judicial determination (P. 46). The defendant
company filed two counterclaims ·a gainst the plaintiff in
said suit, neither of which contained an accounting or an
audit.
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In the accounting suit now pending in the District
Court, there was a pretrial had thereon on ~fay 6, 1955,
before Judge David T. Lewis and the order provided"In view of the offer, the Court adjudges that,
there is no issue in the case, other than to have
an accounting between the parties -the parties
desire time to make this accounting one to the
other, and the matter is continued without date
with the limitation placed upon any trial of issue
limiting such issues to accounting issues referred
to (P. 48)."
On January 20, 1956, the accounting case \Yas set for
trial, at which time the matter was continued and among
other things, the Court made an order that the plaintiff
pay into Court, pending the ultimate outcome of the case,
the sum of $5460.62, on or before ~larch 1, 1956, at "~hich
time and place, the plaintiff agreed so to do and, subsequently, did deposit said amount with the Clerk of the
District Court, where it still ren1ains (P. 58). The Court
also ordered that the plaintiff pay into Court, for the
purpose of having an audit made, the sum of $200.00,
which plaintiff did (P. 58).
That immediately at the conclusion of this hearing
before Judge Lewis, the plaintiff and his eounsel, nlr.
Beezley, (now dece.a.sed) "~alked out of Judge Le,Yis'
chambers into the hall of the City and County Bldg.,
whereupon the plaintiff was in1mediately placed under
arrest by virtue of a warrant based upon a cri1ninal conlplaint charging him with embezzlement, signed and s\\~orn
to by Mr. McGahan, a field auditor for defendant com-
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pany the day before. Thereupon the plaintiff was immediately taken before a Committing Magistrate and released without bond and allowed to leave the State of
Utah (P. 58 and 59).
Pursuant to the order made in the hearing before
Judge Lewis on May 20, 1955, the plaintiff employed the
auditing firm of Lincoln G. Kelly & Co. of Salt Lake City
to make an audit for which he paid the sum of $200.00
and which audit has been introduced in evidence in this
case, marked Exhibit 9, wherein the audit shows a total
potential commission due the plaintiff from the defendant
in the sum of $9,573.62 (P. 58). And this is the only audit
that was ever made between the parties and which the
defendant now seeks to repudiate, although defendant
to this day has not complied with the pre-trial order of
the Court, in which each party was ordered to give to the
other an accounting. The plaintiff has complied with the
order, but the defendant has not and still refuses so to
do. Therefore, the only factual proof before the Court
as to who owe.s who in this accounting case is Exhibit 9
which shows the defendant company in debt to the plaintiff in excess of $9,000.00.
At the trial of the criminal case, on which Mr. Olson
was charged with embezzlement, he was acquitted by a
jury in the District Court (P. 76).
Mrs. Elaine Olson, the wife of the plaintiff, was employed .as the financial secretary of the Salt Lake office
of the defendant herein, (P. 163), and she kept all books
and records of the company from 1947 until the date of
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Mr. Olson's termination of employment. She listened in
on a telephone conversation with 1\tfr. Carlisle, the Vice
President of the defendant company in December of
1953, in which Mr. Carlisle told Mr. Olson that he would
be replaced in January or February, .as State Manager
( P. 164), and the said Carlisle requested Olson to turn
over all money to his successor a 1\fr. 11ason, and Olson
replied that he wouldn't turn the money over until he
had an audit (P.164-165). Mr. c·arlisle then wrote Olson
about the 20th of January that they would not bring an
auditor to Utah just to accommodate Olson, and that they
'Nould make an audit sometime after his termination, but
they gave no specific date as to when they would actually
make an audit (P. 165). She went down to the company
office in Salt Lake City and made a check of 1\Ir. Olson's
business for the preceding seven years, and from her
check of the records and books, she computed what she
had figured the company books showed was owing :Jfr.
Olson, and that was the su1n of $16,000.00 (P. 166-167).
At that time, Mr. Olson had $5,460.62 in the bank. The
next day, the plaintiff and his ·wi.fe \Yent to see }.fr.
Romney, a Salt Lake attorney, and explained the financial
question with him (P.167), and as a result of this confeTence, Attorney Ro1nney \Yrote a letter to the defendant
company (P. 168-Exhibit 2), advising the defendant that
Mr. Olson was holding the $5,460.62 until .an audit could
be made determining who was entitled to this money. To
this letter no offer of settlen1ent was made by the defendant between Feb. and Oct., 195-!. So in order to bring
the matter to a head, the plaintiff con1n1enced a civil
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action in the District Court for an accounting (P. 169).
Plaintiff left Utah on Nove1nber 4, 1955 and went to
W.alnut Creek, California, and before moving he left
his forwarding address at the Post Office. In December
of 1955, the plaintiff received a letter from Mr. J. C.
Carlisle, addressed to his former address in Salt Lake,
which letter was forwarded immediately to their present
address in Walnut Creek, California by the postal.authorities (P. 171). On or about the 7th of December, the plaintiff and his wife received a telegram from Mr. Carlisle
at Walnut Creek, California asking the plaintiff and his
vvife to phone him (P. 172). And there.after, the plaintiff
and his wife went to San Francisco where they had dinner vvith Mr. and Mrs. Carlisle and Mr. and Mrs. Cohn,
who was the State Manager of California for the Independent Order of the Foresters (P. 172).
The audit prepared by Lawrence Olson (no relation
to the plaintiff, Leonard Olson) who is a partner in the
firm of Lincoln G. Kelly & Co., certified public accountants in Salt Lake City, Utah, and marked Exhibit 9, was
identified and offered in evidence (P. 174-175) and after
considerable voir dire examination, by defendants counsel, the Court admitted Exhibit 9 into evidence (P. 179).
Appellant instituted this action ag.ainst respondent
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on May 24, 1956. That said action was and
is based upon malicious prosecution wherein appellant
sought damages, and that the defendant filed Answer
to said complaint denying the allegations therein con-
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tained. That said cause was tried before Judge Ray Van
Cott, Jr. on the 17th day of March, 1957, and that after
appellants evidence was adduced and appellant rested,
re.spondent moved for dismissal which motion \vas
granted by order of said court, from which appellant
has appealed in this matter (P. 219-220).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SHOW LACK O·F PROBABLE CAUSE.
POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUSTAINING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIO·N FOR A NON SUIT AND IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE CAUSE TO THE JURY.

ARGUn1:ENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SHOW LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

In this jurisdiction, in order for the plaintiff to
prove a prima facia case for n1alicious prosecution, he
must establish three elements:
1. That the proceeding co1nplained of as grounds
for the action \vas without probable cause.
2.

That the proceeding was n1alieiou.s.

3. That the proceeding was finally terminated in
favor of the plaintiff.
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We submit that the evidence showing lack of probable cause on the part of the defendant for filing the
complaint, was ample and sufficient as to a lack of probable cause as to h.ave required the Court to submit the
question to the jury. The fundamental basis of an action
for malicious prosecutio·n-is that a defendant instituted
a criminai pro.secution without having such information
as would create in the mind of a reasonable person in
the defendant's position, a:Q. honest and sincere belief
that the accused vya_s g_l!ilty_~f_cr{_m~~ -~harged. Probable cause is a suspicion founded upon circumstances
sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in the
belief that the charge is untrue. If the defendant himself
did not reasonably believe in the guilt of the accused, the
defens·e of probable cau_se _may not be relied on.

the .

Hardraker vs. Moore, 44 C 144;
Carpenter vs. Sibley, 15 CA 589; ---------------Johnson vs. Southern Pacific, 157 C 333;
Center vs. Dollar Markets, 99 CA 2d 534 ;-222
Pac. 2nd 136.
Franzen v. Skink, 192 C. 572;
Smith v. Heusley, 109 P. 2d 909.
These cases are sound law and have been followed
by this Court. In the case of Straker vs. Voyles, 252 Pac.
369, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
"The difficulty in this case, however, is that
although the defendant produced evidence of his
good motives and that he had probable cause, yet
his own conduct was such that the jury were justified in believing that he did not, in good faith,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
believe that he was not actuated by legal malice***
As before stated, while the question of probable
cause is ordinarily one of law, or at least one of
mixed law and fact, as it is sometimes said, yet
when as in this case, a defendant's motives or
belief are in issue, it is the exclusive province
of the jury to determine wheth.~r or not he was
actuated by proper motives and whether- or not
he had sufficient cause to believe and did believe
the plaintiff insane.''
In the ca~e of Sweaton vs. Lilnton, 241 Pac. 309, Page
312, this Court said:

it is.~
defe~se fi:)itii acf1onfor malicious prosecutio-n, -tQ~
a defendant _to_ show that he had fairly and fully
stated all of the facfs out of \vhich the pros~~]Jt~_on
arose to a reputable attorney, and hAd been.advised by such attorney that there \vas probable
cause to initiate the criminal proceedings· agaiiist
the complaining party. It must appear, ho,vever,
without contradiction, that a full and aecura.,te
.statement of all of the facts was made to the attorney before the advice 'vas giveJL .JBi,d that the
party was advised that he had probable cause to
initiate the prosecution .and ~hat he, in good fa_ith,
did believe that there \Yas prooab1e-- cause. There
is some conflict in the autho-rities upon-'this particular question. 0]lr Court, however, is committed
to the rule that a 'full and fair statenlent to a reputable attorney, ..a:nd acting upon the advice of such
atto·rney, that there \vas probable cause is a complete ~~d good defense unless there is some particular evidence or circumstances or facts which
would tend to show that the defendant disbelieved
the fact that he had probable cause"The

authoriti~_s .gener~~Jl_y __hold_t]lat
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"From all of the facts appearing in this
record, we are of the opinion that the question
as to wheth~r Linton,_ in_gQqd faith, believed that
there -wa~p·robable cause for the prosecution of
plaintiff, was fq__r_ p]!e jury."_
'
~-----

-----

......

The court cited the case of McKenzie vs. Canning,
42 Utah 529; 131 Pac. 1172, in which this Court said, in
the course of its opinion:
"It however in effect is urged that before
.advice of counsel may be a defense, it must appear
not only that the defendant fairly stated all the
facts to counsel, and upon them was advised, but
also that the defendant, in good faith, believed
the plaintiff guilty of the charge and as to such
fact, the plaintiff was entitled to the judgment of
the jury."
We submit that the facts, as heretofore set forth in
the Statement of Facts, all of which are in this record
and undisputed, clearly b~!.!g~ thi§_ease within the rule
established that before the defendant can take advantage
of the defense of pro hable caus~, he m_ust hi:f!!self ~~t11ally
believe-fliai_there was probable cause an~.t~at whether he
did in fact .actually believe that there was probable cau.se,'Nas a question of fact for the jury. The affidavit of
Jay Banks, Chief Criminal Deputy County Attorney, on
file in--this case (P. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) recites that at
the time Mr. Bowen, attorney for the defendant company
and- Mr. -McGah.an, the company's auditor, appeared before him and requested a criminal complaint against
Olson, that they represented to Banks that Olson withdre::v the funds which were in dispute, and that he moved
from Utah without notice or knowledge of the defendant
...

~7--:.. -~""----·------~-~~1

': -.

~-~~-

,;t<

--- - . 'J!or

-... ~.~~;.._--... •·

.... . _ ...... ,............

•

~....;..-...:~

~
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corporation or its agents, and Banks specifically recites
that Bowen and l\1cGahan represented to him, "That
efforts had been made to locate Olson without suceesB,
that he could not be located in thee State_ of Utah, and
that the-Iooepe:rid.enf ·order of Foresters first _learne~ f!f
the withdrawal of said funds from the Utah Savings and
Trust Company and of Olson's removal to Ca:lifornig
abouf January 6, 1956." Whereas, in truth and in fact,
the Vice Preesident of the defendant company _and the
company's resident agent in San Francisco, in December
of 1955 had both wired and telephoned Olson at his
address in-~alnut_Creek, Calif()!nia, inviting the Olson's
to have-- a -social evening with them, and the Olson's did
meet with the Vice President of the company in San
Francisco and the company's resident agent there, and
spent the evening with them. The statement of the defendant company's agents to the County . .\.ttorney were in
bad faith because they knew all the tune where Olson
was, because they had located him ·w·ithout any trouble
in Walnut Cteek, California in December of 1955.
We particularly call attention of the Court to the
affidavit of vVm. L. Beezley (P. 15, 16 and 17) in which
Mr. Beezley, on oath, stated that during the hearing of
the criminal case, 1\lr. Banks said to hin1 that if Olson
would agree not to sue the defendant con1pany for nlalicious prosecution, he Banks \vould disn1is.s the criminal
action, which offer Olson declined. To this affidavit, Mr.
Banks has never replied, by counter-affidavit or in any
other manner. Banks further stated in his affidavit (P.
13) that McGahan .and Bowen also advised him that Olson
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had returned to Salt Lake City for said trial and would
be in town on that date. Bowen and McGahan requested
the criminal complaint on the 19th day of J.anuary, 195G
and the civil suit for an accounting between the parties
was to be heard the next day, January 20, 1956. So that
McGahan, who signed the complaint and Mr. Bowen,
his attorney could not have honestly believed, at the time
the cri1ninal complaint was filed, that there was probable
cause for the -issuance ·.of the complaint. And that the
only :reason that they could have had for filing the criminal complaint, the day before the trial, was to use th'2
County Attorney's office as a collection agency.
Mr. Banks also stated in his affidavit, that McGahan
and Bowen had advi_sed him th.at approximately two years
had elapsed between the time of Olson's termination of
employment by the defendant corporation and the date
on which they appeared before him requesting a criminal
complaint, and that during this entire two ye.ars, negotiations were had between J\;Ir. Bowen, who represented the
defendant and Romney and Boyer and William L.
Beezley, who had represented the plaintiff, trying to
work out a compromise settlement of the financial difficulties between them. And Bowen had also advised hin1
that Olson had filed a civil suit in the District Court
demanding an accounting, which was to be heard the
next day. Banks further stated in his affidavit (P. 11)
that Olson's attorneys wrote the Foresters on Feb. 18,
1954, informing said Order of these withdrawals of premiums by Olson, and further advising that said funds
vvould be held by Olson in his name in Utah Savings
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and Trust Company until there was a satisfactory adjustment of the amount claimed by Olson to be owing,
as a result of termination of his ·employment with said
Order. In other words, when McGahan, an auditor for
the comp·any, who had been subpoened by his company
to appear in court the next day and testify against Olson,
as one of the comp.any's auditors and ~1r. Bowen, as
attorney for the defendant company, both knew that the
financial matters in dispute were in civil litigation in the
District Court, that the company had received a letter
from Olson's attorney stating that he was holding the
money until .a compromise settlement could be effected,
or a decision by the District Court, and that the civil trial
was going to take place the next day, and that Olson
would be present in court the next day; they could not
have hone·stly believed that there was probable cause
for issuance of .a criminal complaint.
The trial court did not follow these well established
principles of law heretofore settled by this Court, but
granted a motion for non suit, against the plaintiff, in
the following words: "Mrs. Gold and gentlemen of the
jury, the motion made by the defendant, based on the
Kennedy Case, 154 Utah, will be granted" (P. 214).
183 Pac. 325, 5 A.L.R. 1682.
The trial court, in gr;anting defendant's motion for
a non suit, depTived the_ p1aii1t~ff __Qj his _right to have
the jury determine the question of fact as tQ-whether fue_
defendant actually did in fact honestly believe that there
was probable cause for the issuance of the complaint at
the time he had the criminal coin plaint issued.
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Malice in a l!lalicious prosecution .action may be inferred--from a malicious motive. Naylor v. Peters, 139
----c·A 244. The motive of the defendant in making the
criminal charge is a matter to be .considered by the
jury in--determining the existence of m.alice in a malicious prosecution suit. Runo v. Williams, 162 C. 444.
-

------

Many courts have held that the use of the criminal
process to collect ;~private debt. i~~--;;ia;~ce~~~/malice.
The case 6-f Schnatho-rst v.=-Williams -(Iowa) -3l:l'NW-2d
739, 10 ALR 2d 1199 at 1213, cite.s many cases supporting
this proposition and states :
"The use of criminal process to effect a personal
and private purpose is in itself evidence of defendant's lack of good faith in the prosecution."
And in White v. International Text Book Co. (Iowa)
136 NW 121, the court said :
"It is a universal rule that, if one makes use of
the criminal law for some collateral or private
purpose rather than to vindicate the law as to
compel ... the payment of a debt, such proceeding will be deemed malicious."
We respectfully urge that the rule expressed in these
cases just quoted be specifically adopted as the rule in
this state.
In addition to the evidence of malice from the use
of the criminal process to collect a private debt, the
jury had the right to infer malice from the want . o{
proba/ble . . -cause~- --Singleton v. Sitngleton, 68 CA 2d 681.
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The evidence in this record clearly shows that the
defendant did not actually believe that he had probable
cause for filing of the criminal complaint against the
plaintiff at the time he had the complaint issued, .and the
c·ourt completely ignored the v,;-ell established rule of
law concurred in by this Court, that the defense of probable cau.se is not available to the defendant, if he does
not actually himself believe that there was probable
c.ause; and whether the defendant actually hin1self believed that there was probable cause is a question to be
submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUSTAINING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIO·N FOR A NON SUIT AND IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE CAUSE TO THE JURY.

The trial court, in sustaining the defendant's n1otion
for dis1nissal, and ba_sing it entirelY
.. on the KennedY case,
took the position that sinee the plaintiff~ad be~n bound
over to the District Court by a 1nagistrate, .and that such
a biii-diiig-over- by-the Co-1m11ifting l\Iag·ist;ate c.onstituted
prinia facie evig~nce-- of·p~~bable
c-ause-~iid c-oi1ld @1!
-----·-be relJutted by evidence sho,ving frau_d, perjury, ~E__~!~~~
undue or unfair n1eans en1ployed by the defendant.
This
-we submit was a 1nisapplication of the la"~ by the Court
to the facts as they appeared in the record in this case.
~-.

--

-~--

-

--~

"·

~-----~-~-·

----

-

...,

__

In the case at bar, the Con1n1itting l\Iagistrate bound
the plaintiff over to the District Court to stand trial for
embezzlement, and on trial of the case before the District
Court, was found "not guilty". Does this constitute prilna
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facie evidence of probable cause that can be rebutted
only by evidence of fraucl, _perj_~J:'X_~ClE -~~?-~E- undue_ o~~
unfair means~ We think not.
A

____...... -- '""'··--···· ____..,_...,.. •.

~--.a

We think that this Court has long been committed
to the doctrine that the binding over of the plaintiff to
the District Court for trial, constitutes only prima facie
evidence of probable cau.se and Gan be rebutted by any
competent evidence, which mus"tbe~u~~tted to the jur~
and that th;plainti_{fdoes ~~t have 'tocimpeach the judgment of the Committing Magistrate by -~vidence of perjury_ or f~Jse testimony. In the c.ase of Johnson vs.
J.o/Ieager, 47 Pac. 861, (Utah) Pg. 865, Column 1, __this .,.
Court said:
__

"It is true that the Justice decided in favor of
the prosecution and held the plaintiff, Annie, to
give a bond to keep the peace, but when the case
was brought before the District Court, the prosecution dismissed the action and said that no probable c.ause existed. The judgment of magistrates
against defendants in prose·cution t9 bind persons
to keep the p·eace and in preliminary examinations
are not conclusive. They simply furnish a prima
facie-presumption of ·probable cause: Denier vs.
Huber (75 Cal.-287; 17 Pac. 205). Ne~,vell on Malicious Prosecution, P.age 290; Brown vs. Toure, 4
Cushing 217. The order holding the plaintiff for
bail should have been submitted with all the other_
competent relevent and material e.vidence to the
jury, upon the is_sue of probable cause under proper instructions."
In this early case, this Court recognized the fundamental difference and distinction between the probative
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value to be given a case where the defendant has merely
been bound over by a Committing Magistrate to stand
trial in the District Court, and a case like th~
case in which there .b.ad ...b_~~R-~!1- actual trial by a jury
and· c-ou:ftvested with power _to make final disposition
of the ca_s·~-,~~~ter ji-ldgment -~~d~enteiice~- The' two classes
of c~se;·are entirely separate and distinct, and the rule
of law, as enunciated by this c·ourt in the Kennedy case,
certainly does not apply to the facts of the case at bar,
where the defendant had merely been bound over by a
Committing Magistrate vested with no power to render
a final judgment or impose sentence. Much confusion has
arisen in the_se cases, because many of the trial courts,
including the c.ase at bar, have failed to re-cognize the
....
d~stinction between that class of cases where there has
..
----···· - - .. -.. -.
bee!?- ~Jil!~J judgment in --a trial of tll~ case;-ettner _b:
---------- ·-------the Court or a jury, as in the Kennedy case, and that
class o:f-ca~~s where there has siit;ply be~ -a b~dmg
over by .a Committing ~fagistrate, not vest'e~d _Flt_h~-~ny
power to de- ·th_~- ~ssues ~~~ inlp~-~~- p~~~hment, but
can only decide that there is some cause to hold the
plaintiff for trial in the District Court. The distinction
between these two classes of cases is ver~~ ably set forth
in the case of Ross t'S. Hix·on_. 12 L.R.A. 760, \Yherein
the Court said:
-~--------~

~-~ ~-=·-··~

•'

'''

-

.

-----

dec!

"The sole question discussed in the oral arguInent of coun.sel for defendant in error~ and the
briefs on both sides is as to the \Yeight to be given
the finding of the examining 1nagistrate .as to
whether it is prima facie or conclusive on the question of probable cause and \Yhether or not, in
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either case, the finding must be attacked for fraud
or undue means by proper allegations in the petition"We have been unable to find a reported case
in which the rule has been held as reported by
counsel for defendant in error. There are cases
that so hold where the magistrate has power to
render a judgment of conviction. How much
weight, as proof of probable cause, shall be attributed to the judgment of .a Court in an original
action, when subsequently reversed for error, is
elaborately discussed in the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Crescent City
L.S.L. and S. H. c·o. vs. Butchers Union, 120 US
141, 308 Law Edition, 614, a case much relied
on by counsel for defendant in error. To our mind,
however, the distinction between that case and the
one at bar is plain and distinct. If the magistr.ate
in Bourbon City had possessed the statutory
power to hear the evidence and determine the guilt
or innocense of the defendant and to punish by
fine or imprisonment, if guilt was found, then his
finding and judgment would come -vvithin the rules
established by that case to be the law of the land.
The question in this c.ase is how much weight, as
proof of probable cause, shall be attributed to
the finding of an examining magistrate that an
offense had been committed and that there is
probable cause to believe the defendant guilty
thereof. When the defendant is susequently discharged, the prosecution .against him confessedly
ended, and he has instituted an action for malicious prosecution against the complaining witness.
In the one case, there is a solemn judgment rendered by a court having full and complete jurisdiction, both of the parties and the subject matter,
binding on all until reversed upon .appeal or error.
In the other case, there is a finding in effect, that
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sufficient facts have been developed that justify
a magistrate in sending the parties before a Court
competent to ultimately deal with the question of
guilt or innocense. Aga~_1_ :while __a__con-¥iclion is
generally conclusive of probable cause, yet it may
be overcome -nysliovv~ng that it was procurred by
fraud, undue means,gr the false-±e.stim-Ony Df the
·- -- ·
prosecution.
"In such a case, the petition in the action for
malicious pro.secution must directly attack the
judgment of conviction or it will be suicidal. It is,
therefore, unimportant whether the words used
by the Court in the Bower vs. Clay or dicta or
authoritive in that case, as they express the la~.~
as universally held b·y all courts of last resort
that have .spoken on the subject. It_ follows that
the other suggestions o{_._~gunsel, that_llie frndiDg
of the magistrate ni!ist J~g_ di~ectl~__a_tta.cked in
the Petition for fraud or undue means is ''ithout
force, becau·se tliat ~ f~ndTn_g is only._pr~~- facie.
because a11 that- is necessary- foi~--plaiiitiff to -do-.
to win, is to overthrow it b~~ a prep~iiide1-;ance -=m_
the evidence."
Walton Trust Co. rs. Taylor, 2 Fed. 2nd, 342, the
Court said:

"\V-e think these instructions clearly state the
la "\V on the n1atter of the binding over of plaintiff
h)~ the Justire of the Peare .and the acquittal of
the plaintiff in the Circuit Court, and the follo"\\~
ing was said :
"Inas1nuch as the he~ring _oefoxe.the ~Iagis
trate-that is to say the Justice of the Peace\vas for the express purpo.se of inquiring into
the existence of probable cause, and in as n1uch
.as in this ease, such inquiry "\vas n1ade "\vhich resulted after hearing on the n1erits in the concluSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion and judgment of the magistrate that the
plaintiff should be held for trial in the Circuit
Court, this judgment of the magistrate constitutes
in law, prima facie evidence of such fact, namely
probable cause, to believe that the defendant was
guilty. By prima facie evidence is not that degree
o{ proof which in the absence of satisfactory
rebutting proof- will justify a jury in concluding
that the defendant had probable cause to believe
the plaintiff guilty.
"Now then, speaking ag.ain of the evidence and
of - the finding of the magistrate upon the preliminary hearing, such evidence gentlemen, is not
conclusive, b11t is _to-- he_taken and considered by
you in-- connection with all the evidence in the
case"Counsel for defendants contend that the
action of the justice of the peace was conclusive
on the question of probable cause, unless the
plaintiff showed such .action of the justice was
procured by fraud or pe~rjured testimony, citing
Hansen vs. Huber 271 Mis_souri, 326. 197 Southwestern 68. We do not think the case supports
counsel's contention. The question there involved
was not as to the evidentiary value of a committment on the question of probable cause, but the
question involved was as to the evidentiary value
of the judg1nent of conviction which had been rever_sed.
"The charge of the trial court in the instant
case, as to the effect of the committment by the
justice of the peace, is amply sustained by the
authorities."
In Foster vs. Evans, 297, Pac. 106, the California
Court said:
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"The fact alone that reasonable men divided
on the question of guilt or innocense, would of
itself seem to be .slight, if any evidence of probable
cause, but there is no question that the fact that
respondent was held to answer is prima facie evidence of the existence of probable cause, but it is
not conclusive. Diemer vs. Herber, 75 California
287; 17 Pac. 205, and while th~_~.roe£
is on the .plaintiff:jn an actionior...malicitl-Us-pr-ase.::
cutio:JJ, t9 _,show .w-ant-·of---prebabl~~.±here is
ample evidence in the record here."
Steidham vs. Diamond, State Brewery, 21
Atlantic 2nd 283 - "The almost uniform current
of the law is to the effect that the~action of a
committing magistrate or of a municipal court
in li"olding-a"d.erendant rnbail on a crjJnjn,al charge
to await the action of a grand jury, i~___!!__prima
facie showing of probable cause for the institutio_n
of the charge~. so· too, is the action of the grand
jury iri ·presenting a true bill, such indictment
constitutes prilna facie showing of probable cause.
In neither case does the action sho·wr conclusive
evid~nceorprobable ·cause;-but merely prilua facie
evidence \Yhich n1ight be rebutted by other testi~-o-~y. ''
. -It is perfect!~? clear that the trial court, in follo,Ying
the Kennedy ease and appl~?ing the ruling of the l{ennedy
case to the facts of the rase at bar, clearly f.ailed to n1ake
a distinction bet"?een that class of rases """here there
has been a judgn1ent by the Court on the rnerits, as in
the Kennedy case, and "?here there had sin1ply been a
binding over by a Cornn1itting l\{agistrate~ as in the rHse
at bar.
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In the l{ennedy case, this Court explicitly limited
its ruling to the facts of that case wherein there had
been a final judgment of conviction in the City Court and
an appeal from the conviction, and the decision of the
City Court reversed upon appeal.
In th§ Kennedy c.ase, this Court said:
---~-~---

...... -.. _-_,__.,.._ . .,_, ___._._,,,_._--·. --·-

-·~~·-

____ r_......""---··--~.

-···-

"Neither is it contended th.at the Complaint
fails to show that the proceeding finally terminated in favor of the plaintiff. The que.stion is
narrowed down to the proposition as to whether
or not the cornplaint, on its face discloses a want
of probable cause for the proceeding complained
of. The complaint alleges the fact that the
plaintiff, in the City Court, was convicted
of the offense instituted against him by the defendant. And under authorities hereinafter cited,
such a conviction is at least prima facie evidence
of probable cause for the prosecution, notwithstanding the conviction is afterwards reversed.
Some of the ~uthorities go so f.ar as to hold that
such evidence is absolutely conclusive, but in our
opinion, the weight of judicial opinion, as well a.s
that of jurists and text writers, is to the effect
that evidence of a convic_tion is only prima facie
and may b-e- rebuffed by competent evidence, which
impeaches the validity of the judgment. As will
be seen from the decisions to which we shall refer,
the most common expression is that a judgment
of c-onviction against the -plaintiff, in a case of
this kind, can_ be impeached and _overthrown only
by showing that tlie judgment was procured by
perjury, fraud, or other undue means."
It is perfectly apparent that this Court, by its expres.sed language, intended to confine its ruling, requiring
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that the judgment could be over-turned only by evidence
of fraud and perjury, was limited to those cases where
there had been a conviction and that as far as this Court
would go.
" ..... Conceding this to be true, there is no
escap·e from the conclusion that a judgment of
conviction followed by a reversal, when offered as
evidence in a case for malicious prosecution, is at
least prima facie evidence of probable cause for
the prosecution. It follows therefore, that where
the complaint ·itself, in an action for malicious
prosecution, shows that plaintiff was convicted in
the proceeding complained of, notwithstanding
a reversal afterwards on appeal, the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, unless it goes
farther .and alleges some fact or facts, the legal
effect of \vhich is to ilnpeach the validity of the
judgment and render it \vorthless as e\idence of
probable cause. The fact or facts so alleged should
be to the effect that the judgment of conviction
relied on as proof of probable cause procurred
by fraud, perjury or other undue or unfair
means."
The expre.ssed language of this court llinits its ruling
to those cases in \vhieh there had been a judgment of
conviction. And only in such eases \\~ould it require evidenee of fraud or perjur)~ in order to attack the judgment.
Clearly, this eourt in the l{ennedy case confined its
decision to the particular facts of that case, ruunely,
where thert> had been a conviction and a judg1nent in the
City c·ourt, by a court and jury vested by la". . ,vith
authority to tr). . the facts and n1ake .a final judg1nent
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and inflict punishment. And it did not, by its language,
extend the ruling to include cases such as the case at
bar where there had simply been a binding over by the
Co1nmitting Magistrate to stand trial in the Third Judicial District Court. We believe that the distinction between these two classes of cases is sound and that the
ruling in the Kennedy case should never be extended
by this court _so as to include cases similar to the case
at bar and give the s.ame probative value to the decision
of a committing magistrate as it does to the judgment
of a Court and jury vested with authority to hear the
facts and make a final decision and render a judgment~
,and requiring the plaintiff, in order to recover in a judgment for malicious prosecution, to prove that the judgInent of the committing magistrate was induced by fraud
or perJury.
To extend the rule of the Kennedy case to cases
such as the c.ase at bar, relieves the defendant from all
the consequences. of his malicious acts in using the criminal courts as .a collection agency, and maliciously and
intentionally injuring the plaintiff simply because the
committing magistrate felt there was some evidence that
should be submitted to a jury.
All member_s of the Utah Bar and the members of
this Court know that our committing magistrates as a
pr.actical matter, bind the defendant over to the District
Court, if there i~. the_ slight~§t .e-Yidence of pis guilt and
leaves the question of his ultimate iuilt to.lh~·"Jury in
the District Court and .for this court to give to such a
judgment of a committing magistrate the same probative
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value on the que.stion of probable cause, as it does a
final judgment by a court and jury vested with authority
to hear the facts and render a final judgment, as were
the facts in the Kennedy ease, would not be sound law
or justifiable by this Court.
We believe that all the defendant was entitled to in
this case was to have the judgment of the committing
magistrate holding that there was probable cause submitted to the jury, along with the other evidence, as this
court indicated in the case of Johnson vs. Meager, 47
Pac. P. 61.

SUMMARY
The plaintiff was employed from 19±7 to 1954 by
the defendant corporation as its manager for its insurance business for the State of Utah, at ''"'hich time the
plaintiff's employn1ent was terminated by the defendant.
That at the time of the termination of en1ployment, the
defendant was holding certain monies, \vhich the plaintiff
claimed was owing hi1n by the defendant company for
commissions and rene,vals earned by hin1 during his einployment. Prior to his tern1ination, the plaintiff requested
an audit by the eon1pan~~ (P. 3-!-35) and advised the defendant con1pany that he \ronld not turn the n1oney over
until he was furnished an audit (P. 35). That at no tin1e
did the con1p.any furnish the plaintiff \Vi th an audit, striking a balance bet,veen the plaintiff and defendant. That
many eonferenees \vere had bet\veen the plaintiff and
defendant and their respective attorneys for the purpose
of trying to deter1nine \rhether or not there was any
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money due the company. That on the 27th day of October, 1955, the plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court to compel the defendant to make an
accounting and to determine the question as to which one
was indebted to the other. In the pre-trial held before
Judge Lewis on May 6, 1955, the c·ourt stated that the
only issue in the case w.as an accounting between the
parties as to the amount of renewals and commissions
earned, and the amount of monies retained by the plaintiff. He also granted time for the respective parties
hereto to make an accounting one to the other.
The accounting suit filed by Olson w;as set for trial
on January 20, 1956. The day before the day the case
was to be tried, the defendant's auditor, Mr. McGahan,
and its attorney, Mr. Bowen, secured a criminal complaint ag.ainst Olson for embezzlement, well knowing
that the issues as to who owed who the money was to
be settled the following day in a civil action. On the next
day, January 20, 1956, a continuance of the trial of this
case wa.s granted by Judge Lewis, who made an order
that plaintiff pay into the Clerk of the Court, the sum
of $5,460.62, and also deposit $200.00 to have an audit
made on the company's books. Mr. Olson complied in full
with the Court order, and eventually an audit w.as made
of the company books by Lincoln G. Kelly and Co., certified public accountants, of Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit
9), which showed that there was due and owing to Olson
approximately the sum of $9,000.00. That immediately
upon leaving Judge Lewis's Courtroom, after the order
above described was entered, the defendant was arrested
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outside of Judge Lewis's Courtroom and taken before a
Committing Magistrate, who released him without bond.
Thereafter, the criminal case was tried in the District
Court before a jury, who found the plaintiff "not guilty''
of the charges preferred against hin1.
The facts in this record conclusively show that the
defendant, at the time he had the criminal complaint
issued, did not hone.stly believe that there was probable
cause to file the criminal complaint, and that the question of whether the defendant honestly believed that there
was probable cause was a matter that the Court should
have submitted to the jury.
The evidence conclusively shows that the acts of the
defendant corporation's auditor and attorney, in securing
a criminal complaint for embezzlement against the plaintiff, the day before the trial of the issues, \Yas an overt
act of using the County Attorney's office as a collection
agency to compel the payment of the clain1ed indebtedness.
CONCLlTSIOX
That the Court erred in not sub1nitting to the jury
the question as to \Yhether or not the defendant actuall:
believed, at the tune the cri1ninal action "-as instituted,
that there was probable cause for the issuance of said
crilninal complaint: and, that the trial court in granting
the defendant's n1otion for a non suit~ follo,ving the
](ennedy case, failed to recognize the "Tell established
rules of la\v as heretofore enu·nciated by this Court and
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having never been r,eversed .by this Court, that there is
a vital distinction between that class of c.ases of which
the Kennedy case is typical, where there has been an
actual trial by a court vested by law with authority to
try the facts, enter a judgment, .and pas.s sentence, and
that class of cases like the case at bar, where the plaintiff was only bound over to the District Court by a Committing Magistrate not vested by law with any power
or authority to render .a final judgment and impose sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND R. BRADY and
DEAN E. FLANDERS,
Counsel for Appellant
616 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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